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 The Effect of CNATRA Student Production Goals on Required 




 Military units are continually expected to do more with less.  This is especially 
true in the Naval Aviation Training Commands.  Military forces are globally committed 
now, while training commands are producing a product for the future.  As such, both the 
operationally committed forces and the Shore Training Commands need experienced 
Fleet Aviators.  Practically, however, Operational Commanders get priority and Training 
Commands are forced to provide qualified officers to fill compulsory Individual 
Augment (IA) billets.  Eventually, this policy of ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’ will 
adversely impact the flow of newly qualified officers to back-fill the Fleet.  The objective 
of this study is to determine a realistic manning level for a single squadron in the Naval 
Aviation Training Command and use that information to provide leadership with a quick-
estimate manning ratio of students to instructors.  This ratio will allow leadership to 
quickly estimate potential production shortfalls if student requirements change 
unexpectedly.   
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
A. INTRODUCTION 
 While operational missions are critical now, the Aviation Training Command 
product (i.e., new pilots) is critical to the continued success of operational units.  The 
Chief of Naval Aviation Training (CNATRA) recently raised the requirement for new 
pilot output by 15% (CNATRA, 2007), while instructor manning levels have remained 
constant.  At what manning level will the supply of Instructor Pilots (IP) be insufficient to 
meet the demand for CNATRA’s student production goal?  This study examines the 
impact of increasing student production goals without a proportional increase in IP 
manning levels in Helicopter Training Squadron EIGHT (HT-8). 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
 Naval Aviation Training Commands serve as shore duty assignments for 
Instructor Pilots.  Traditionally, the missions of shore duty commands complement and 
enable the missions of operationally deployed units.  In the current military environment 
(GWOT, cost-wise readiness, BRAC, “right sizing” of forces, etc.), shore personnel with 
Fleet experience (i.e., instructors) are routinely selected to fill compulsory IA billets.     
 With an ever-increasing demand for operational Naval Aviators, the requirement 
for greater pilot production is also increasing.  There is a “whip” effect felt at the training 
command level when the operational Fleet requires more trained aviators.  For example, 
Fleet Squadrons will pressure the Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS) to produce more 
pilots.  The FRS in turn will look toward its supply (i.e., Advanced and Primary Training 
Squadrons) and apply pressure for more pilots.  The end of the whip is felt at Aviation 
Preflight Indoctrination (API) where demand for potential aviators is increased.  In order 
to meet the demands of the Fleet and factoring in an attrition rate at each training level, 
the result is a 15% increase in pilot production from FY06 to FY07 (CNATRA, 2007) for 
HT-8.  Due to the requirements of the Operational Fleet, a proportional increase in 




C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
 The objective of this research effort is to provide Training Air Wing FIVE (TW-
5) leadership with a realistic estimate of the instructor manning level required to meet 
annual student production goals.   
Specifically: 
• Is HT-8 manned to the appropriate level now? 
• What is a realistic loading level for available instructor flight time?  Manning a 
squadron by assuming that 100% of an instructor’s flight time will be used for student 
production is impractical.  Manning decisions must take in to account recurring instructor 
qualifications and operational surge capability to develop an appropriate loading level for 
available instructor flight time. 
• At what manning level will HT-8’s ability to meet the CNATRA student production goal 
be at risk?  The number of students HT-8 can produce is directly proportional to the 
number of instructors HT-8 has available for student production.  If HT-8’s instructor 
pool is continually drawn from to fill operational billets, eventually HT-8 will not be able 
to meet production requirements.   
• How do the findings of this analysis compare with the official manning policy for HT-8 
(CNATRA manning document)? 
• Can a manning ratio (instructors to achievable student production) be developed for 
executive use in forecasting potential shortfalls if student production requirements are 
changed unexpectedly? 
 
D. PROJECT SCOPE 
 The analysis will focus on a single unit (HT-8) in the Naval Air Training 
Command.  The instructor manning level discussed in this analysis refers to the number 
of instructors that are committed to student production.  Unit specific tasking of 
instructors that does not directly lead to completion of student syllabus flight events must 
be considered separately by leadership.   
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The analysis will avoid consideration of unit-level organizational and supporting 
activity decisions, including: 
 • Process bottle-necks (choke-points) caused by squadron policy on qualifying 
Instructor Pilots (IPs) to teach specific training events.  
 • Squadron-specific limitations on IP and/or student flight time. 
 • TDY funding levels. 
 • Aircraft availability. 
 • Outlying fields’ availability / limitations. 
 • Airspace / Working area limitations. 
 • South Whiting (home field) limitations. 
 Waivers of Naval Aviation governing documents will not be considered.  For 
example, OPNAVINST 3710 allows monthly individual flight hour limitations to be 




The following steps were undertaken to achieve the goals of this research: 
• Determine available fly days per instructor per year 
• Determine theoretical maximum hours per instructor per year 
• Determine programmed student flight time requirements for syllabus completion 
• Determine reasonable student flight time requirements for syllabus completion 
accounting for variability 
• Convert reasonable student flight hours to determine yearly demand 




• Determine available fly days per instructor per year 
 Available fly days per instructor per year were calculated to be approximately 140 
days.  See Appendix A for detailed calculations and explanation. 
• Determine theoretical maximum hours per instructor per year 
After calculating available fly days per instructor per year, the days were 
multiplied by the OPNAVINST 3710 daily maximum of 6.5 flight hours.  This number 
was compared to the OPNAVINST 3710 annual maximum of 595 flight hours per 
instructor.  Flight hour waivers were not considered.  The lower of the two numbers was 
then considered to be the maximum annual available instructor flight time.  See Appendix 
A for detailed calculations and explanation. 
• Determine programmed student flight time requirements for syllabus completion 
 The demand for flight time by students for syllabus completion as stated in 
CNATRAINST 1542.156: 
• Advanced Helicopter 66 Events  (Estimated 113.6 flight hours) 
• Osprey   39 Events  (Estimated 60.0 flight hours)    
• Flight Surgeon   5 Events  (Estimated 8.2 flight hours) 
• Determine reasonable student flight time requirements for syllabus completion 
accounting for variability 
 The CNATRA student curriculum places a flight hour goal on each student event.  
Several factors (weather, student ability, airfield congestion) cause instructors to 
routinely over or under fly the flight hour goal for each event.  For this analysis, a Monte 
Carlo simulation of 1,000 runs was used to estimate a reasonable flight hour total per 
student while accounting for this variability.  The following numbers were generated:  
• Advanced Helicopter 117.4 flight hours 
• Osprey     66.5 flight hours    
• Flight Surgeon     8.0 flight hours 
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See Appendix B for detailed calculations and explanation. 
• Convert reasonable student flight hours to determine yearly demand 
• Advanced Helicopter 31,345.8 flight hours 
• Osprey        665.0 flight hours    
• Flight Surgeon      368.0 flight hours 
The total student flight hour requirement for the year is 32,378.8.  See Appendix B for 
detailed calculations and explanation. 
• Determine Full Time Equivalent manning level based on student demand and 
instructor supply  
 FTE manning level was calculated to be 77.8 for a 70% instructor loading level.  











A. FLIGHT TIME LIMIT   
 Instructors are limited by annual flight hours available, not number of days 
available for training.  An initial assumption entering this analysis was that CNATRA 
does not properly account for the number of days a flight instructor has available for 
training.  As such, an independent method for determining days available for instruction 
(explained in Methodology) was devised.  The team found that (on average) a flight 
instructor has approximately 140 days available for flying.  The team then multiplied 140 
days by the OPNAVINST 3710 daily maximum flight time (6.5 hours) to yield 910 
annual flight hours per instructor per year.  This exceeds the OPNAVINST 3710 
maximum annual flight time of 595 flight hours by 53%.  As such, instructors are limited 
primarily by flight time and not by days available for flight training.  This study found 
that the days available for flight training contribute more to instructor morale and ease of 
scheduling; they are not a limiting factor for purposes of manning decisions. 
 
B. LOADING LIMIT 
What is a realistic loading level for available instructor flight time?  
Answer: 70% instructor loading level. 
In order to answer the first research objective (i.e., to determine whether HT-8 is 
manned correctly now), loading level results must first be explained.  Figure 1 shows a 
graph of Instructor Pilot (FTE) Manning versus Loading Level on the left axis, with 
Probability of Waiting shown on the right axis.  Probability of Waiting is defined in this 
study as the probability that a student will not be able to fly because there is not an 
instructor available on a day when the student otherwise should be flying, i.e., his pre-
requisites are complete, weather is good, he is not sick, etc.  For example, if Probability 
of Waiting is 10% and there are 100 students in syllabus, then 10 students will not be 
scheduled to fly because there are not enough instructors to fly the students.  Obviously, 
the Probability of Waiting should be 0%.  This occurs at 70% instructor loading level and 
corresponds to an instructor pilot FTE of 77.8 instructors.  This means that the 
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Commanding Officer should expect his pilots to devote an average of 416.5 flight hours 
annually (595 hours x 0.70) to student training.  The remaining 178.5 hours are available 
for instructor proficiency training and recurring qualifications, assuming no unforeseen 
scheduling conflicts develop.  If unexpected, long-term scheduling conflicts develop 
(such as a hurricane or mishap) then the Commanding Officer maintains a 30% surge 
capacity with his instructor force to recover lost flight events during the scheduling 
conflict.  If the system were tasked at 100% during “normal” conditions, lost production 
could never be re-gained if the system encountered a setback of any kind (minor or 
major).         
 

















































C. MANNING LEVEL 
Is HT-8 manned to the appropriate level now? 
Answer: Yes, almost.  
 As discussed above, a 70% instructor loading level translates to an ideal instructor 
manning FTE of 77.8.  Again, this is based on the FY07 projection of 267 advanced 
helicopter, 10 Osprey, and 46 Flight Surgeon students.  The actual manning level of HT-8 
as of February 2007 is 76.25 FTE (CNATRA, 2007).  This translates to an actual 
instructor loading level of approximately 71.4%.  The theoretical probability of a student 
sitting when he should be flying is 0.3%.  In other words, HT-8 is almost ideally manned 
right now to handle their assigned student production for FY07.  
 
D. CRITICAL MANNING LEVEL 
At what manning level will HT-8’s ability to meet the CNATRA student production goal 
be at risk? 
Answer:  - Critical = 68.1 FTE instructors (80% loading level) 
               - Improbable < 61.2 FTE instructors (89% loading level). 
 In hindsight, this is somewhat of a vague question.  Obviously, this analysis can 
not account for all factors that affect flight training; however, based on the planning 
factors available a reasonable estimate can be made.  Figures 2 and 3 both show that 
Training Time (Fly Weeks) and Students Eligible for Flight Events, respectively start to 
increase dramatically as instructor loading level increases above 80%.  An 80% loading 
level corresponds to 68.1 FTE instructors.  
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Figure 2: Training Time (Fly Weeks) and IP Manning versus Loading Level 



















































Figure 3: Average Students in HT-8 and IP Manning versus Loading Level 
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Figure 4 shows a graph of Instructor Pilot (FTE) Manning versus Loading Level on the 
left axis, with Probability of Blocking shown on the right axis.  Mathematically, 
Probability of Blocking is the probability that there are as many students ready to fly as 
there are instructors (c) plus students in the waiting pool (K).  Realistically, this is the 
probability that the pool of students waiting to begin flight training starts to increase 
because there are not enough instructors available to meet the training demand imposed 
by the incoming students, i.e., the system is literally clogged with students who are 
otherwise ready to fly.  The probability of this scenario occurring begins to increase from 
zero at 89% instructor loading level (61.2 FTE instructors).  Incidentally, the Probability 
of Waiting at 89% instructor loading level is 30% (Figure 1).  This means that 
approximately 30% of students who are otherwise ready to fly will be sitting because 
there are not enough instructors available to fly when the student is ready.  For this 
reason, a loading level above 89% (61.2 FTE instructors) makes it improbable for HT-8 
to meet its CNATRA student production goals.   











































E. ANALYSIS VS. REALITY 
How do the findings of this analysis compare with the official manning policy for HT-8 
(CNATRA manning document)? 
 The findings of this analysis were generated independent of CNATRA influence 
and are based primarily on Navy-wide (OPNAVINST 3710) guidance and queuing 
theory.  This analysis is far less complex than the CNATRA manning algorithms, but 
generates similar numbers, while taking far less time and money to develop.  The project 
basically approached a manning issue from an academic standpoint based on two years of 
an Executive Masters of Business Administration education, specifically, Operations 
Management and our own personal experiences as flight instructors working at the 
ground level. 
 
F. MANNING RATIO 
Can a manning ratio (instructors to achievable student production) be developed for 
executive use in forecasting potential shortfalls if student production requirements are 
changed unexpectedly? 
Answer: Yes. 
 • Ideal: 70% loading level = 3.45 students/instructors 
 • Critical: 80% loading level = 3.94 students/instructors 

















V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Link BUPERS manning levels with forecasted CNATRA Production goals.  
Recommend BUPERS representative for Instructor Pilot requirements attend semi-annual 
Production Alignment Conference. 
• Research squadron level “bottle necks” or scheduling inefficiencies.  While this project 
accounted for HT-8 as being one link in the chain for pilot production, looking inward to 
the operations department, scheduling, and individual IP qualifications may add to the 
overall efficiencies of the entire pilot production chain. 
• Consider outsourcing Instructor Training Units (ITU) Instructor Pilots to contract pilots.  
Currently, training squadrons are required to provide resources (i.e., instructor pilots) for 
the ITU, which has an impact on available FTE instructor pilots at the squadron level.  
Outsourcing to civilian contractors to fill the instructor pilots at the ITU may help to 
alleviate some of the strain on the squadron when they are required to part with FTE 
instructor pilots. 
• Examine MPTS inefficiencies (each student gets a two-hour brief, flight and debrief).  
The current syllabus defines how the instructor pilot is to manage his training events.  
Each instructor pilot and student is required to brief and preflight within a two-hour 
period, fly an event, and then debrief for thirty minutes.  One single event takes 
approximately four to five hours to accomplish.  Two events take twice as long.  











With an operational loading level set to 70%, Table 1 shows the required FTE 
manning level to be 77.8 or 78 instructor pilots.  The result of increasing IPP by 15% 
without increasing FTE manning levels is HT-8 operating at approximately an 80% 
loading level.  The effect this has on surge capacity is potentially crippling to operations 
and IPP goals.  As seen from the graphs, operating at an 80% or greater loading level 
reduces the squadron’s ability to recover from delays such as weather or mishaps.  




267 Adv Helo + 10 Osprey + 46 Flight Surgeon 
Loading Level (%) 65% 70% 75% 80% 89% 
FTE manning level (Monte Carlo 1,000 runs) 83.8 77.8 72.6 68.1 61.2 
Ratio (Student Load/Instructors) 3.20 3.45 3.70 3.94 4.39 
Ratio (Instructors/Student Load) 0.312 0.290 0.271 0.254 0.228 
307 Adv Helo + 12 Osprey + 46 Flight Surgeon 
FTE manning level (Monte Carlo 1,000 runs) 96.3 89.4 83.4 78.2 70.3 
Ratio (Student Load/Instructors) 3.20 3.45 3.70 3.94 4.39 
Ratio (Instructors/Student Load) 0.312 0.290 0.270 0.254 0.228 




















 Multiple directives and natural forces limit an instructor’s maximum flight time.  
This analysis accounts for hard limits imposed on flight time by Naval Regulations 
(OPNAVINST 3710), airfield closures, estimated weather days, estimated instructor sick 
days, and estimated instructor ground requirements (i.e., duty, academics).  This analysis 
also accounts for quality of life limitations on flight time, including 30 days leave per 
instructor per year and estimated convalescent/other leave requirements.  Finally, 
operations analysis studies show that loading a queuing system (i.e., a flight training 
pipeline) to 100% of its capacity will dramatically impact the system processing time 
(Anupindi, 1999).  As such, the available instructor flight time should not be loaded to 
100% of capacity.   
 This study analyzes instructor manning level based on the number of instructors 
available to train students.  These instructors are called Full Time Equivalent (FTE) 
instructors.  Factors that limit the available time for instruction for certain squadron 
personnel are not considered.  In other words, instructor manning level in the context of 
this study is not the number of instructors actually assigned to HT-8; it is the number of 
FTE instructors in HT-8.  Consideration of instructor time constraints in ground jobs is 
left to unit leadership.  
 Exact data does not exist for several of the considerations listed above (i.e., 
weather days, sick days, and duty days) for a variety of reasons.  First, weather 
cancellations may only occur for a fraction of a day.  The lost training is tracked as lost 
events, not days.  Second, though Operations maintains oversight of instructor schedules, 
it is not cost beneficial for them to track the number of sick days and duty days an 
instructor is actually assigned.  Thus, an estimate of these days was required for this 
analysis.  A Triangular distribution was used for this estimate.  The Triangular 
distribution provides a reasonable estimation based on observation of the minimum, 
maximum, and most likely number of days lost for each reason by each instructor.  
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The following method was used to determine total available fly days per 
instructor per year.   
 • 365 days per year 
 •104 weekend days 
 • 30 leave days 
 • 10 federal holidays 
 • 4 safety stand downs   
 • Duty days: Triangular Distribution (10 minimum, 24 expected, 28 maximum) 
 • Weather days: Triangular Distribution (27.2 minimum, 40.8 expected, 54.3 
 maximum) 
 • Sick days: Triangular Distribution (3 minimum, 8 expected, 15 maximum) 
 • Other days: Triangular Distribution (3 minimum, 8 expected, 15 maximum)  
 
 The weekend, leave, federal holidays, and safety stand down days are known no-
fly days, and they apply equally to all instructors.  Though some instructors do fly on 
weekends and/or federal holidays without a squadron requirement to do so, all weekend 
days and federal holidays are considered no-fly days in this analysis because Whiting 
Field is closed.  Also, instructors take different amounts of leave, but for planning 
purposes, the squadron should assume all instructors take the leave they earn each year.  
Safety stand downs are mandatory, no-fly training days for all squadron personnel. 
 The distribution of duty days is based on the assumption that most instructors 
stand two days per month with some instructors standing slightly more, and others 
standing considerably less.  This monthly requirement equates to approximately 24 days 
per year per instructor. 
 The distribution of weather days is based on 137 cloudy days in Pensacola per 
year (CityRating.com/Weather History, http://www.cityrating.com/cityweather).  These 
days are assumed to be evenly distributed on days that are otherwise available for flying 
and on known no-fly days (weekends, holidays, safety stand downs, leave); therefore, 
81.5 days are cloudy that otherwise would have been available for flying.  On cloudy 
days, a reasonable expectation is that only half of the flight schedule is lost.  Worst case, 
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two-thirds of the flight schedule is lost and best case about one-third is lost.  Thus, the 
minimum, expected, and maximum weather days per year are 27.2, 40.8, and 54.3, 
respectively.  
 Sick days and other days are not explicitly tracked by the HT-8 Operations 
Department.  Based on observation, the numbers are assumed to be three days minimum, 
eight days expected, and fifteen days maximum per instructor for each category. 
The variability in weather, duty, sick, and other days was accounted for using 1,000 runs 




 Instead of accepting the CNATRA estimate for flight hours, the following 
distributions were used for each event.  Units of measure are flight hours per flight event. 
 
 Advanced Helicopter Triangular (1.4 minimum, 1.7 expected, 2.0 maximum) 
 Osprey   Triangular (1.4 minimum, 1.7 expected, 2.0 maximum)    
 Flight Surgeon Triangular (1.2 minimum, 1.6 expected, 2.0 maximum) 
 
 The CNATRA student curriculum places a flight hour goal on each student event.  
Several factors (weather, student ability, airfield congestion) cause instructors to 
routinely over or under fly the flight hour goal for each event.  For this analysis, a Monte 
Carlo simulation of 1,000 runs was used to estimate a reasonable flight hour total per 
student while accounting for this variability.  The following numbers were generated:  
 
 Advanced Helicopter 117.4 flight hours 
 Osprey     66.5 flight hours    
 Flight Surgeon     8.0 flight hours 
 
 Now, the analysis multiplies the flight hours per student by the number of 
students required in FY07 (267 Advanced Helicopter, 10 Osprey, 46 Flight Surgeons) to 
determine a total student flight hour requirement.  For Advanced Helicopter, it is 
31,345.8 hours per year, for Osprey, it is 665.0 hours per year, and for Flight Surgeons, it 




 A reasonable loading level was determined to be 70% and applied to the available 
maximum instructor flight hours.  Solving for required FTE instructor manning level 
yields the following formula: 
   FTE = Total Student Flight Hour Requirement 
    (Loading Level * Maximum Flight Hours per Instructor) 
The FTE was calculated to be 77.8. 
 Determining an appropriate Loading Level required some imperfect, but 
reasonable assumptions about the student production pipeline.  First, the pipeline was 
assumed to be a complex queuing system where servers (instructors) service customers 
(students) independently.  Second, student arrival times to the system and the time they 
spend in the system are assumed to be independent and exponentially distributed random 
variables.  This is reasonable since most of pilot training is independent effort in the 
aircraft, but imperfect because parts of flight training require more than one student for 
continuation (i.e., formation, academic classes, student solos).  Third, there are c 
instructors in the system.  Fourth, there is an input buffer (pool) of K students 
continuously waiting to start flight training.  The complex set of equations required to 
model this system was compiled by Dr. Jan Van Mieghem in an Excel spreadsheet called 
QUEUMMCK.XLS, available at http://www.prenhall.com/anupindi.  An immediate 
limitation of the assumptions made in this analysis is the fact that each student is serviced 
multiple times by the available instructors, not only once as the equations assume.  This 
limitation is mitigated by using annual servicing rates to determine time-to-train, 
probability of waiting, and probability of system blocking, but the total students in the 
system calculated by this analysis is limited to students in the waiting pool plus the 
number of instructors available (K + c).  This is not accurate since there are about twice 
as many students in the system as there are instructors available.  
 To determine loading level, only the largest primary mission of HT-8 was 
considered: advanced helicopter training.  The requirement for HT-8 to train Osprey 
pilots and Flight Surgeons was ignored for a baseline analysis of instructor loading.  The 
FTE instructors required to man HT-8 at each instructor loading level were found using 
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the procedure outlined earlier.  Once the number of instructors required to achieve each 
loading level were known, the ramifications of each loading level on the training system 
could be determined.  Numbers used in the QUEUMMCK.XLS spreadsheet were: 
• Ri = 267 students per year (mean arrival rate) 
• Rp = 5.07 students per year per instructor (mean processing rate) 
• Tp = 0.1972 years per student (mean processing time) 
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